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COMMENTS
INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS - L
This is the first in a series of two notes which will present (1)
a brief survey and criticism of the decisions governing insanity as a
defense in criminal prosecutions in this country and in England
and (2) a suggestion of tests more in keeping with modem medical
and psychological research than those presently used. Temporary
insanity, caused by liquors or narcotics, has been omitted, because
legal treatment of this type of insanity coincides with modern psycho-
logical thought.
The term "insanity" ordinarily connotes a more or less deranged
condition of the mind. The mind controls our adaptation to environ-
ment. When derangement causes conduct which the community con-
siders to be evidence of disease and as implying irresponsibility, the
individual concerned is said to be insane and the law may step in to
certify him as such. In a jural sense, insanity bears upon an indi-
vidual's ability to meet the requirements of the society in which he
lives. It is not a medical or physiological concept, but a purely
social and legal one.' Since the legal concept concerns adjust-
ment to environment, it is evidenced by failure to adhere to standards
of conduct in a particular society. The word is but a label used to
describe human reactions not tolerated by society. It may well be
thaf an act classified as the product of insanity in one society might
not be so labeled in another; it is a relative term.
To fully understand insanity as a defense to criminal prosecution,
the types of insanity and how they are generally classified must be
understood. Although no classification is entirely satisfactory, the
following, taken in part from the Encyclopedia Britannica,2 satis-
fies our purpose:
GROUP I
C haracterized by qual-
(1) Moronity tive defect of mental
(2) Imbecility functions, generally ac-(3) Idiocy companied by observ-
able defect or changes
in the brain
I Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence (1931) 459.
2 12 Encyclopaedia Britannica (14th ed. 1929) 385.
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GRouP II
(1) Manic-depressive insanity (
(2) Dementia praecox Characterized by psy-
(Schizophrenia) chical symptoms. No
(3) Paranoia group
(4) Neuroses and psycho-neuroses constant changes in
(neurasthenia, anxiety, corn- brain yet established
pulsion neuroses and hysteria)
GRouP III
(1) Toxic insanity ( Charecterized by ac-
(2) General paralysis of the tual diseases in which
insane organic changes can be
(3) Organic brain diseases observed in the brain
(4) Epileptic insanity tissue
This classification can be placed into two principal divisions,
amentia and dementia. Group I is the type known as amentia, while
Groups II and III are known as dementia.
Amentia refers to situations where the mental condition is due
to some developmental defect, either before birth from structural
malformation of the mother or some acute infection such as syphillis,
or immediately after birth through injury or disease. In this group
are the feebleminded, typed according to intelligence as morons, im-
beciles, and idiots, who are insane from birth onward. The extent
of their insanity is measured by intellectual ability, appreciation of
environmental problems, and their adaptation to the social scheme.
The dement, on the other hand, is normal in all ways at birth
but fails later in life to adjust himself to society. Why he fails is a
difficult question to answer. Frustrations, environmental conditioning,
and organic brain lesions are but a few of the possible reasons given
by eminent psychiatrists.- However, difficult as the diagnosis may
be, it is of paramount importance to the lawyer in determining whether
his client may plead insanity as a defense. The client may be saved
from death or imprisonment as a criminal by his lawyer's analysis
of his case.
There are differences in the degree of dementia, generally re-
ferred to as psychoses and neuroses. The psychotic is the exaggerated
condition and in most cases requires institutionalization. The neurotic
or milder form usually confronts the attorney.
To appreciate the nature of insanity, one must realize that ab-
normal characteristics are nothing more than normal ones carried to
an extreme. Normalcy itself defies definition.
3 Shaffer, L. F., The Psychology of Adjustment (1936)
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LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF INSANITY
Insanity as a defense to criminal prosecution is the subject of
considerable conflict of judicial authority. It is generally agreed that
to negative criminal intent insanity must amount to a definite un-
soundness rather than passion or mere eccentricity. Courts agree
generally that mental weakness, or the group previously referred to
as amentia, does not warrant exemption from responsibility for acts.'
Mere ignorance or a low order of intelligence is not a defense,
nor will a person with a lower form of intellect receive a lower degree
of punishment. If found guilty, a person typed as amentia will
generally suffer the same penalty as a person with normal mind.
Mental aberrations in law may be classified into four principal
categories: intellectual, perceptional, volitional, and emotional.'
1. Intellectual insanity. This category includes cases in which
the "wright and wrong" test of modem jurisprudence may be ap-
plied 6 Mental depravity, naturally within this group, is not included
since it is not recognized in the law as a valid defense.
2. Perceptional insanity. This category includes, "those subjects
suffering from an illusion or hallucination. Courts recognizing such
mental states relieve the subject from responsibility if the act would
have been justified if the illusion or the hallucination had been
real."'
3. Volitional insanity. A minority of the courts recognize this
type of insanity as "irresistible impulse."" Usually the defense is
not a complete one unless accompanied by a measure of intellectual
insanity.
4. Emotional insanity. This category is recognized in but few
jurisdictions. Judicial opinion concerning it has been expressed as
follows :9
Where the subject's intellectual and volitional powers are
unimpaired, he should be able to keep his passions in check.
Some courts, however, recognize the existence of a distinction
between passion which merely overwhelms the barriers of re-
flections and restraint, and passion which for a space of time
effects a complete derangement of the intellect. That passion
which effects a total derangement of the intellect is legal in-
4 16 Corpus Juris (1918) 98; see also State v. Keerl, 29 Mont. 508, 75 Pac. 362,
101 Am. St. Rep. 579 (1904).
5 Annotation: 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032.
614 American Jurisprudence (1938), Criminal Law 789.
7 Ibid., at page 789.
8 Ibid., at page 789.
9 Annotation: 10 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1034; see also Duthey v. State, 131 Wis. 178,
111 N. W. 222 (1907).
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sanity while the partial inability to restrain from doing an act
is not. The majority of the courts generally concede that if
a subject has sufficient capacity to recognize that his act is
wrong, mere passion or emotional insanity caused by anger orjealousy cannot be used as a defense to relieve the accused
from criminal liability for his acts.
TESTS USED IN DETERMINING CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although some courts are of the opinion there is no workable test
for determination of insanity,' the majority opinion is that there
are tests which can be applied to the facts of a particular case by
a jury to determine whether or not a person was sane enough to
be legally responsible for his act. Some of the tests the courts have
used are described in the following paragraphs.
1. Wild beast rule. This rule was laid down in 1724.11 The
accused, in order to take advantage of it, had to exhibit traits of a
wild beast. He was either a raving maniac or he was completely
sane. The rule was promulgated before the advent of any psy-
chiatric research and remained in existence for only a short period
of time. It was never recognized by the courts of this country as
a valid criterion because of its severity.
2. Lord Hales rule. The essence of this rule is that a man
to be responsible for crime must have the capacity and understand-
ing of a normal child of fourteen years32 There is only one
reported case in this country where the rule was followed.3 It
has failed of recognition probably because the courts have never
recognized mental depravity as a defense in criminal prosecutions.
3. Right and wrong test. This test is used in all the courts
of this country, except in Rhode Island where the court has never
passed upon the question of a legal test, and in New Hampshire.1 4
In New Hampshire, "no legal test of irresponsibility by reason of
insanity exists. Here it is a question of fact for the jury in each
case whether defendant had a mental disease, and if so, whether
it was of such character or degree as to take away the capacity to form
or entertain a criminal intent."' 5 The right and wrong test was
first fully stated in M'Naghten's Case'6 where, in answer to ques-
tions propounded by the House of Lords to the judges as the
effect of insanity upon responsibility for criminal acts, it was said
10 State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871).
"I M'Naghten's Case, House of Lords, 10 Clark and Fin. 200 (1843).
12 Hale, The History of Pleas of the Crown (1847) 29.
a State v. Richards, 39 Conn. 591 (1873).
14 State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369, 9 Am. Rep. 242 (1871).
'
5 Supra. 9 Am. Rep. 242 at p. 258 (1871).
16 Supra, note 11.
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that jurors should be instructed that a man is presumed sane and
possesses sufficient reasoning ability to be held responsible for a
crime until the contrary is proved to their satisfaction, and to establish
such defense it must be proved to their satisfaction that at the time
of committing the act the party was laboring under such a defect
of reason "as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing
wrong."' 7
Chief Justice Shaw, widely quoted on this subject, presents the
following view :'
A man is not to be excused from responsibility if he has
capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong as to the particular act he is then doing
- a knowledge and consciousness that the act he is doing is
wrong and criminal and will subject him to punishment. In
order to be responsible, he must have sufficient power of
memory to recollect the relation in which he stands to others,
and in which others stand to him; that the act lie is doing is
contrary to the plain dictates of justice and right, injurious to
others, and a violation of the dictates of duty.
There are some courts who construe this rule as referring to
the ability to distinguish right and wrong conduct in general.19 How-
ever, this is not the majority opinion. 20  The prevailing view is
that the capacity of the acused to distinguish right from wrong
must be in respect to the specific crime at the time of its com-
mission, and does not mean his capacity to abstractly distinguish
right and wrong.2 Under this view, the accused may be con-
sidered sane on all subjects except the one concerned in his prosecu-
tion, and if he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong as
to that one, his defense is complete. But, if he has knowledge and
consciousness that the act he is doing is wrong and he will deserve
punishment if apprehended, he is sane and guilty regardless of mental
weakness."
17 Supra, note 11, at p. 204.
1s Comm. v. Rogers, 7 Met. (Mass.) 500 at p. 501 (1844).
19 Stevens v. State, 31 Ind. 485, 99 Am. Dec. 634 (1869) ; Jolly v. Com. 110 Ky. 190,
61 S. W. 49, 96 Am. St. Rep. 429 (1901) ; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 31
Am. Rep. 360 (1879); Com. v. Wireback, 190 Penn. 138, 42 A. 542, 70 Am. St.
Rep. 625 (1899) ; State v. Bundy, 24 S. C. 439, 58 Am. Rep. 262 (1885).
20 14 American Jurisprudence (1938), Criminal law 796.
21 Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 35 Am. Rep. 20 (1879) ; Armstrong v. State, 30
Fla. 170, 11 So. 618, 17 L. R. A. 484 (1892); Hornish v. People, 142 Ill. 620,
32 N. E. 677, 18 L. R. A. 237 (1893); State v. Knight, 95 Me. 466, 50 A. 267(1902); Hawe v. State, 11 Neb. 537, 10 N. W. 452, 38 Am. Rep. 375 (1881);
State v. Roy, 40 N. M. 397, 60 Pac. (2nd) 646, 110 A. L. R. 1 (1936) ; Flannagan
v. People, 52 N. Y. 467, 11 Am. Pep. 731 (1873) ; State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah
135, 134 Pac. 632, L. R. A. 1916 D, 590 (1913) ; Duthey v. State, 131 Wis. 178,
111 N. W. 222 (1907), 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1032.
22 Supra, note 20.
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4. Irresistible impulse. An irresistible impulse as defined by the
courts is an impulse "induced by, and growing out of, some mental
disease affecting the volitive, as distinguished from the perceptive
powers, so that the person afflicted while able to understand the
nature and consequences of the act charged against him and to per-
ceive that it is wrong, is unable, because of such mental disease,
to resist the impulse to do it." The classic example is klepto-
mania. Irresistible impulse is not to be confused with mere passion
or an overwhelming emotion not connected with a diseased mind.
"Heat of passion", used in manslaughter statutes of several states,
therefore is not included within the doctrine of irresistible impulse.
Irresistible impulse is sometimes confused with emotional or moral
insanity, and also with the right and wrong test.
Emotional insanity is the state of mind of one who, while
in possession of his ordinary faculties, and unaffected by any
mental disease, gives way to his passions to such an extent that
he becomes a temporary maniac. Strictly speaking, this is not
insanity at all, from the legal standpoint, which requires the
existence of some mental disease.2
Confusion also arises from statements of the right and wrong
and irresistible impulse tests conjunctively. Doubt is created as to
whether the court will give the accused a choice of tests in building
his defense, or will require that the mental condition of the accused
satisfy both tests at once.2
Some states rule out the doctrine of irresistible impulse by statute ;
some authorities are not agreed as to whether to recognize it or not -'
and others, notably Wisconsin,28 reject it by court decision. Those
repudiating it state it is harmful because it gives too great immunity
to the accused.
MENTAL DEPRAVITY
The great majority of the courts agree that an adult charged
with commission of a crime is not to be judged by a comparison
of his mental ability with that of a twelve-year-old infant, or by'
similar comparisons. In Patterson v. People9 it was held that if a
23 Annotation: 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461 at p. 466; see also L. R. A., 1918 D, 794.
24 State v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 A. 276, 55 L. R. A. 373 at p. 377 (1902).25 Annotation: 70 A. L. R. 680.26 New York Penal Law, Sec. 34; see, People v. Silverman, 181 N. Y. 235, 73 N. E.
980 (1905).27 Annotations: 18 L. R. A. 224; 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 461; L. R. A. 1918 D 794.
28 State v. Wilner, 40 Wis. 304 (1876) ; Bennett v. State, 57 Wis. 69, 14 N. W. 912
(1883) ; Butler v. State, 102 Wis. 364, 78 N. W. 590 (1899) ; Eckert v. State, 114
Wis. 160, 89 N. W. 826 (1902); Lowe v. State, 118 Wis. 641, 96 N. W. 417(1903) ; Schissler v. State, 122 Wis. 365, 99 N. W. 593 (1904) ; Oborn v. State,
143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737 (1910) ; Simecek v. State, 243 Wis. 439, 10 N. W.(2nd) 161 (1943).29 Patterson v. People, 46 Barb. (N. Y.) 625 (1886).
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low order of intellect or education is to excuse homicide, a rule
results which gives it far greater immunity than is now afforded.
Again in People v. Farmer0 it was conceded that the defendant had
an inferior and untrained intellect, and her moral perceptions were
of a low order. The jury, however, "were not required to pass upon
the quality and strength of her intellect, or upon her moral perceptions,
except as such questions affect the general question of the defendant's
knowledge, at the time of the homicide, or the nature and quality
of the act she was doing. A weak or even a disordered mind is
not excused from the consequencies of crime."' In State v. Johnson3 2
the court in its instruction to the jury stated:
It does not follow, however, that one of less mental caliber
than another but still knowing the nature of his act and whether
it is right or wrong is to be excused from responsibility therefor.
In order that the plea of feeblemindedness shall prevail the
evidence must be sufficient to justify you in finding that at the
time he first fired the fatal shot which resulted in the death of
the deceased that he did not have sufficient mental capacity to
know the difference between right and wrong or the nature
of the act which he was doing.




Although an accused no longer must exhibit beast-like character-
istics in order to be excused from criminal responsibility, courts still
are very reluctant to entertain any rule which extends increased
immunity to the accused. This attitude, sometimes puzzling to the
psychiatrist, is deeply rooted in the jury system, where sympathy may
bubble through the smallest legal loophole, and where local conditions
and tendencies play a large role. The judicial attitude is revealed
in the leading Wisconsin case of Oborn v. State3 in which Justice
Marshall writes:
The term "insanity", as used in the special plea in a criminal
case, means such abnormal mental condition, from any cause,
as to render the accused at the time of committing the alleged
criminal act, incapable of distinguishing between right and
wrong and so unconscious at the time of the nature of the act
which he is committing, and that commision of it will subject
him to punishment.
30 People v. Farmer, 194 N. Y. 251, 87 N. E. 457 (1909).3
" Supra, at page 265.
32 State v. Johnson, 233 Wis. 668 at 670, 290 N. W. 159 (1940).
- Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 S. 854 (1887) ; People v. Spencer, 264 Ill. 124,
106 N. E. 219 (1914) ; Sharp v. State, 161 Ind. 288, 68 N. E. 286 (1903) ; Com.
v. Rogers, 7 Met. 500, 41 Am. D. 458 (1844) ; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467,
11 Am. R. 731 (1873); Leache v. State, 22 Tex. A. 279, 3 S. W. 539 (1886).3
-Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249 at 268, 126 N. W. 161 (1910).
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The right and wrong test is universally accepted, 35 and is the only
test used in twenty-nine of the American states, including Wis-
consin, and in England. The more liberal test, that of irresistible
impulse, is applied in seventeen states and the District of Columbia.
This test is summarized and its future applicability discussed in the
principal case of Parsons v. Peoplef where the court states:
If, therefore, it be true, as a matter of fact, that the disease
of insanity can, in its action on the human brain through a
shattered nervous organization, or in any other mode, so affect
the mind as to subvert the freedom of the will, and thereby
destroy the power of the victim to choose between right and
wrong, although he perceives it - by which we mean the power
of volition to adhere in action to the right and abstain from the
wrong - is such a one criminally responsible for an act done
under the influence of such controlling disease? We clearly
think not, and such, we believe to be the just, reasonable, and
humane rule, towards which all the modem authorities in this
country, legislation in England, and the laws of other civilized
countries of the world, are gradually, but surely tending***
to show.
Such optimism is not shared by courts not adhering to the doctrine,
for in Cunningham v. State, 7 the court states:
It (irresistible impulse) may serve as a metaphysical or
psychological problem, to interest and amuse the speculative
philosopher, but it must be discarded by the jurist and the law-
giver in the practical affairs of life.
Since the majority of courts adhere to the right and wrong test,
they continue to disregard all criteria of mental depravity. Undoubt-
edly the inadequate standard applied by Sir Matthew Hale,38 known
as Lord Hales rule, did much to discourage acceptance of any test
which uses mental age as a standard for responsibility. In recent years
careful and serious research has been carried on in this field by such
notable psychologists as Binet,.3 Terman, ° Thomdike.4 ' and others,4
and certainly the results of this research can be of help to the judge
in pondering the age-old question of instructions to a jury in a
criminal case where mental abnormality is alleged.
NoRRis NORDAHL
35 Weihofen, Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law (1933) 15.36 Parsons v. People, 81 Ala. 577 at 586, 2 S. 854, 60 Am. Rep. 193 (1887).
37 Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269 at 279, 31 Am. Rep. 360 (1879).3s Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (1847) 29.39 Binet, Etude Experimental de I'ntelligence (1905-08); see also, Woodworth,
Psychology (1929) 27.
40 Terman and Merrill, Measuring Intelligence (1937).
41 Thorudike, E. L. et al, The Measurement of Intelligence (1927).
42 Freeman, Mental Tests, Their History, Principles and Applications (1926);
Kuhlman, A Handbook of Mental Tests (1922) ; Rorschach, Psychodiagnostik.
Methodik und Ergebnisse eines wahrehmungs-diagnostischen Experiments(2nd 1932) ; Wechsler, The Measurement of Adult Intelligence (1939).
